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Summary Ruling on Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment
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A

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to UCA §78-2a-3(2)(j)
(2004).
STATEMENT OF ISSUE AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
Plaintiff/Appellee (hereinafter sometimes referred to as "Plaintiff') disagrees with the
Statement of the Case and the Statement of the Issues presented by Defendant/Appellant (hereinafter
sometimes referred to as "Defendant"). Plaintiff sets forth the following characterization of the
issues on this appeal for this Appellate Court's consideration.

FIRST ISSUE
Whether the Plaintiff properly pled the correct elements to support a breach of contract claim
against the Defendant?
Standard of Appellate Review. The proper standard of appellate review for the First Issue
is a review for correctness1. (Calhoun v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins Co., 96 P.3d 916, 920
(Utah 2004)).
SECOND ISSUE
Whether the Fifth Judicial District Court, in and for Washington County, Utah (hereinafter
"Trial Court") properly Dismissed Defendant's Counterclaim when Defendant failed to Properly
Pled and Provide Evidentiary Support for Her Counterclaim at Summary Judgment?

1

Appellant states that the proper review is the "abuse of discretion" standard. While the
Appellee believes that the proper standard of review is for correctness, in the alternative,
Appellee does not object to this Appellate Court applying the abuse of discretion standard of
review.
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Standard of Appellate Review. The proper standard of appellate review for the Second Issue
is areview for correctness. (Calhoun v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins Co., 96 P.3d 916, 920
(Utah 2004)).
THIRD ISSUE
Although Defendant sets forth several issues, these issues can be properly categorized and
treated as one issue. Whether the Defendant's Allegations that Plaintiff Submitted a Fraudulent
Billing, Breached its Fiduciary Duty, Infliction of Emotional Distress, Breach of Loyalty and Breach
of Contract are Unsubstantiated by the Record and Provide No Genuine Issue of Material Fact?
Standard of Appellate Review. The proper standard of appellate review for the Third Issue
is areview for correctness. (Calhoun v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins Co., 96 P.3d 916, 920
(Utah 2004)).
FOURTH ISSUE
Whether the Trial Court properly Awarded Attorney's Fees in the Prosecution of this Breach
of Contract Case?
Standard of Appellate Review. The interpretation of an unambiguous contract presents a
question of law that is reviewed for correctness. (Kraatz v. Heritage Imports, 71 P.3d 188 (Utah App.
2003).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The instant case was initiated in the Fifth Judicial Trial Court, in and for Washington County,
Utah (hereinafter "Trial Court") by the Plaintiff filing a complaint against the Defendant based upon
her failure to pay for legal services and costs which were advanced on her behalf. (R. at 1-4).
However, this straight forward breach of contract action has swelled into a three-volume Trial Court
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file which includes several motions by the Defendant/Appellant (hereinafter sometimes referred to
as "Defendant") for the authorization of the unlicenced practice of law, Rule 11 sanctions against
the Defendant, and finally the summary judgment process which led to this appeal.
This appeal is taken from summary judgment which was granted in favor of the Plaintiff on
the 23rd day of June, 2004 pursuant to Rule 56 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. The Summary
Judgment Order is based upon the Summary Ruling on Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment
entered on the 23rd day of June, 2004. (See copy of Summary Ruling attached hereto to Appellee's
Brief).
STATEMENT OF FACTS
1.

On the 4th of November, 2002, Defendant entered into a legal services agreement whereby
Plaintiff agreed to perform legal services and advance costs for and in behalf of the
Defendant in exchange for Defendant's promise to pay the same, plus interest and other
terms of said agreement. (R. at 352 (citing to Defendant's Responses to Plaintiffs First
Request for Admissions (R. at 372)).

2.

There is no dispute that Defendant signed the subject legal services agreement. (R. at 352,
372, 638-639). |

3.

Plaintiff provided legal services and advanced costs on behalf of the Defendant during its
course of representing the Defendant. (R. at 638-643).

4.

There is no genuine dispute that the subject legal services agreement provided that
contractual interest at the rate of eighteen percent per annum was to accrue upon any unpaid
balance due to Plaintiff by Defendant. (R. at 3, 64, and 610-643).

5.

There is no dispute that Plaintiff incurred attorney's fees and costs in its collection efforts

against the Defendant. (R. at 354).
6.

On the 23rd day of June, 2004, the Trial Court entered its Summary Ruling on Plaintiffs
Motion for Summary Judgment and thereby granted the relief sought by the Plaintiff through
its Motion for Summary Judgment. (R. at 656-659).

7.

On the 12th of July, 2004, Judgment was entered by the Trial Court in favor of the Plaintiff.

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
When viewed for correctness, there are no genuine issue of material fact which preclude the
entry of the Summary Judgment against the Defendant and in favor of the Plaintiff. There may be
issues as to some facts, however, such facts are immaterial facts. Defendant goes into great lengths
to re-argue her memoranda filed in opposition to Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment.
However, a review of the three-volume R. reflects that the Trial Court was able to sift through the
arguments espoused by the Defendant and finally duly considered the undisputed material facts upon
which it based its summary judgment.
ARGUMENT
L

Whether the Trial Court properly granted Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment
in this breach of contract action when Plaintiff properly pled and supported its cause
of action against Defendant?
A.

Plaintiff properly pled the necessary elements to prevail on its breach of
contract claim against the Defendant.

In order to prevail on its breach of contract action against the Defendant, it was necessary for
Plaintiff to prove and establish four elements; namely (1) the existence of a valid and enforceable
contract; (2) performance by the plaintiff; (3) breach by the defendant; and (4) damages to the
Plaintiff resulting from the breach. fBennett v. Jones, 70 P.3d 17, 26 (Utah 2003)).
-4-

First, Defendant engaged by written contract the legal services of the Plaintiff. (R. at 352,
3 72). On the 4th day of November, 2002, Defendant executed a written legal services agreement with
the Plaintiff. (R. at 352, 372, 385-386).
Second, Plaintiff rendered legal services and advanced costs for and in behalf of the
Defendant. (R. at 379-382 (Affidavit of Shawn T. Farris in Support of Plaintiffs Motion for
Summary Judgment).
Third, by the express terms of the written contract, Defendant was contractually obligated
to immediately pay the periodic invoices sent to the Defendant. (R. at 382). However, Defendant
failed to pay for the legal services rendered and costs advanced by Plaintiff for and in behalf of the
Defendant. (R. at 381).
Fourth, Plaintiff suffered monetary damages as a direct result of Defendant's failure and
refusal to pay for the legal services and costs advanced to her by the Plaintiff. (R. at 381).
Defendant avers that Plaintiffs Complaint fails to "establish^" that Plaintiff "performed its
duties under the contract and that this failure supports the Appellant's contention that the Trial Court
abused its discretion is granting Plaintiff summary judgment. (Appellant's Brief at p. 15). However,
this allegation is both factually incorrect and legally incorrect. First, the complaint does not
"establish" any particular element of a cause of action; the complaint is a notice pleading to provide
notice of a cause of action. Plaintiffs Complaint alleges that Defendant entered into a written
contract, that Defendant owed to Plaintiff an amount of money, identified by dollar figure, and that
Defendant failed to pay after demand was made upon her for payment. (R. at 2-3). Plaintiffs
evidentiary establishment of the amount due and owing by the Defendant was presented to the Trial
Court by the motion throughout Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment. (R. at 55-64; 98-112;
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346-406; 610-653).
The State of Utah adheres to a liberal notice pleading requirement. (Tishbaugh v. Utah
Power & Light 969 P.2d 403, 406 (Utah 1998)). In the case of Fishbaugh, the argument was made
that that while the City of Salt Lake ("City") in the Fishbaugh case conceded that "a municipality's
failure to properly maintain streetlights is actionable only if lighting is necessary to warn of a
hazardous condition rendering the street unsafe", the City argued, however, that Fishbaugh, the
Plaintiff, never asserted in his complaint that the street was unsafe due to a hazardous condition but,
rather, asserted only that the City and UP & L were negligent for simply failing to maintain the
streetlights. (Id at 406). Thus, the City maintained that Fishbaugh was precluded from asserting that
lighting was required to render the street safe. However, the Utah Supreme Court in Fishbaugh held
that under Utah's liberal notice pleading requirements, all that is required is that the pleadings "be
sufficient to give 'fair notice of the nature and basis of the claim asserted and a general indication
of the type of litigation involved, (citing, Gill v. Timm, 720 P.2d 1352, 1353 (Utah 1986) (quoting,
Blackhamv. Snelgrove. 3 Utah 2d 157, 161, 280 P.2d 453, 455 (1955)).
Similarly, Plaintiff in the instant appeal provided ample notice in both its Complaint and in
the pleading submitted in support of its Motion for Summary Judgment, that Plaintiff had rendered
legal services and advanced costs on behalf of the Defendant. (R. at 2, 379-382). Therefore, under
Utah's liberal notice pleading requirements, all that is required is that the pleadings be sufficient to
give fair notice of the nature and basis of the claim asserted and a general indication of the type of
litigation involved." (Fishbaugh at 406). Appellant argues that the Trial Court "abused its
discretion" when it granted Plaintiff summary judgment despite the Defendant's position that "there
was no language in the firm's Complaint establishing that it performed its duties under the contract."
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(Appellant's Brief at p. 15). Appellant's argument lacks merit and does not support the finding of
an abuse of discretion by the Trial Court.
B.

The Trial Court did not err in the calculation of the Summary Judgment.

At the Trial Court level and on appeal, Defendant attempts to misconstrue and blur the
material issues. Defendant, in her Appellant's Brief, alleges that there was no "explicit or express
language" in the written legal fee agreement which supports that she was responsible for what
Defendant calls the "sample invoice" dated July 15, 2003 and eighteen percent interest. (See
Appellant's Brief at p. 16).
Defendant alleges that the invoice and the interest rate were "never within the four corners
of the fee agreement." (Id.) However, this billing issue was specifically addressed in the summary
judgment process and clarified. (R. at 610-643). The subject legal services agreement expressly
provides, within the four comers of the document, for the contractual interest rate. (R. at 3, 64, and
610-643).

The Trial Court properly permitted the award of the contractual interest which had

accrued upon all unpaid amounts due and owing to the Plaintiff by the Defendant.
The "sample invoice" to which the Defendant refers is an exhibit which was filed with the
Trial Court during the summary judgment process. Defendant attempts to misconstrue the billing
ledger glosses over the fact that the Trial Court only entered a judgment against the Defendant for
the actual amount of unpaid attorney's fees ($9,806.89) and accrued interest at the contractual rate
of eighteen percent per annum. (R. at 842).
II.

Whether the Trial Court properly Dismissed Defendant's Counterclaim when
Defendant failed to Properly Pled and Provide Evidentiary Support for Her
Counterclaim at Summary Judgment.
The Defendant cannot rely upon the mere allegations or denials of her pleadings to avoid a
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summary judgment but must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.
(Thomock v. Cook. 604 P.2d 934 (Utah 1979)).

Defendant did not sufficiently pled her

counterclaim of fraud. During the Summary Judgment process, Defendant failed to distinguish or
refute the case law cited by Plaintiff and the supporting affidavits. The case of Semeno v. Hill 982
P.2d 587 (Utah 1999) sets forth the elements required to establish a valid claim for fraud. The
Defendant is the instant case failed to set forth the necessary support and pleadings to support her
counterclaim.
The Defendant argues that there was an implied agreement to bill fairly and accurately. The
Defendant cites to the case of Kraatz v. Heritage Imports. 71 P.3d 188 (Utah 2003) in support of her
argument The case of Kraatz was a breach of contract case for an automotive dealer. In Kraatz, the
former manager was awarded $432,941.36 in attorney's fees. The issue discussed in Kraatz was
whether the pre-litigation fees incurred may be recovered by a plaintiff under an attorney's fees
clause in a contract. However, Kraatz is a breach of contract action; not a action based on fraud.
The fact remains that the Defendant did not properly plead her counterclaim and her mere statements
in support of her fraud action did not adequately defend against Plaintiffs Motion for Summary
Judgment.
For example, Defendant avers, without other supporting expert opinion, legal authority or
otherwise, that she merely "disputes" the unpaid balance claimed Plaintiff was owed, and she states
that "It is my belief [the Defendant's] that Plaintiff mailed the May 7, 2003 invoice willingly and
knowingly, in an attempt to induce me into believing that I was obligated to pay the fees billed in
that invoice, in retaliation against me because my daughter had previously questioned Plaintiffs
billing practices." (R. at 472). However, Utah law clearly provides that "[statements made merely

-8-

on information and belief will be disregarded. Hearsay and opinion testimony that would not be
admissible if testified to at the trial may not properly set forth in an affidavit. fWalker v. Rocky
Mountain Recreation Corp, 508 P.2d 538, 542 (Utah 1973)). As in the Walker case, the instant
appeal is analogous in that the language quoted by the Walker court applies to the present appeal.
The Walker court states at page 542: "Defendant's opposing affidavit reveals no evidentiary facts
but merely reflects the affiant's unsubstantiated opinions and conclusions in regard to the
transactions." (Id.)
III.

Whether the Defendant's Allegations that Plaintiff Submitted a Fraudulent Billing,
Breached its Fiduciary Duty, Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress, Breach of
Loyalty, and Breach of Contract are Unsubstantiated by the Record and Provide No
Genuine Issue of Material Fact.
After the Plaintiff withdrew from representing the Plaintiff, a billing, dated May 7,2003, was

inadvertently sent to the Defendant which reflected a clerical error. The May 7,2003 billing invoice
had identified the time that the Plaintiff had expended when the Defendant had made threats against
Plaintiff. However, there was never an anticipation that Defendant would be held liable for this time
expended after the withdrawal of the Plaintiff as counsel for the Defendant; it was merely the
accounting of attorney time. Once this clerical error was discovered, Plaintiff informed the
Defendant of this clerical mistake. (R. at 620-621, 641-642). More importantly, the summary
judgment against the Defendant never sought the payment of any of this clerical billing error. (Id.)
Nevertheless, Defendant spent significant time arguing that this clerical error was tantamount
to fraud upon the Defendant. However, once again, this is neither a material issue in dispute for
purposes of summary judgment nor lends any support for a claim for fraud against the Defendant.
The issues for summary judgment must be material to that ruling and not merely a restatement of
Defendant's unsupported beliefs or opinions. "[T]he affidavit of an adverse party must contain
-9-

specific evidentiary facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. (Treloggan v. Treloggan.
699 P.2d 747 (Utah 1985)).
While it is true that Defendant disputed the reasonableness of the Plaintiffs billing,
Defendant's argument of reasonableness is not supported by any expert opinion, any legal authority
or any other evidentiary support other than her mere statements of her beliefs and opinions that she
disputes the reasonableness of the fees billed. For example, Defendant stated to the Trial Court in
her opposition to the Motion for Summary Judgment that "I [the Defendant] admit that I have no
idea how Plaintiff arrived at the figure of $9,906.89". (R. at 463). This lack of knowledge on the
part of the Defendant does not amount to a materially disputed fact which would preclude summary
judgment. (See, Treloggan and Walker cited above). There are not any other affidavits filed in the
Record which supports Defendant's arguments that Plaintiffs fees were unreasonably calculated,
not incurred, or improperly calculated. As discussed above, such averments are not sufficient to
defeat a motion for summary judgment. (Id.).
IV.

Whether the Trial Court properly Awarded Attorney's Fees in the Prosecution of this
Breach of Contract Case?
It is interesting to note that the Defendant characterizes the instant case as a "simple debt

collection case" as she argues that the Trial Court should not have awarded the attorney's fees
incurred by the Plaintiff in seeking the collection of this delinquent billing owed by the Defendant.
(Appellee's Brief at p. 33). This Appellate Court need only view the three volumes of pleadings,
consisting of no less than eight hundred forty-five (845) pages, of the Record of the Trial Court to
realize that this is certainly not the average, simple debt collection case. Moreover, a cursory review
ofthe Record supports the proposition that a considerable amount attorney's fees and costs were duly
incurred in prosecuting the debt collection action against the Defendant for the unpaid account and
-10-

defending against the numerous pleadings filed by the Defendant. (See R. at 1-845).
The subject legal services agreement expressly and clearly provides that "in the event that
of collection procedures become necessary with respect to a delinquent account where the account
is assigned to an outside attorney firm, all the costs and expenses, including but not limited to
reasonable attorney's fees incurred in collecting such delinquent account shall be added to [the
client's] the bill." (R. at 386). However, despite this express language and in response thereto,
Defendant alleges and states by way of her affidavit at paragraph forty-seven (47) the following: "At
no time during representation did Mr. Gentry, or any person associated with Plaintiff, ever inform
me that it was Plaintiffs belief and understanding that the language regarding attorney's fees
incurred for 'collection of a delinquent account' meant that if Plaintiff and/or I filed any action to
enforce the fee agreement, that the prevailing party wold be entitle to recover its attorney fees and
costs in prosecuting or defending such action. "(R. at 470-471). The Trial Court correctly recognized
this type of argument presented by the Defendant as a "imaginative parsing of contract language to
avoid its clear intent." (R. at 656).
CONCLUSION
In the instant case, Defendant repeats the same arguments raised at the Trial Court level.
However, the Trial Court was properly able to see through the myriad of immaterial facts,
unsubstantiated beliefs and opinions, and arguments espoused by the Defendant. The granting of
Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment by the Trial Court was based upon uncontroverted
material facts. Likewise, the Trial Court's denial of Defendant's Cross Motion for Summary
Judgment was based on fact that the Defendant failed to plead and otherwise support all of the
necessary elements of her claim and this denial can hardly be deemed an abuse of discretion. For
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the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff respectfully requests that the Utah Court of Appeals affirm the Trial
Court's Order granting summary judgment.
DATED this _ ^ d a y of April, 2005.
Respectfully Submitted,
BARNEY & MCKENNA, PC

I^M-J
Heath Snow
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellee

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that on the 2^1—day of April, 2005, a true and correct copy
of the foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLEE was duly served by depositing in the U.S. mail, first class
mail, postage prepaid, addressed as follows:
Michael W. Sanft
520 South Fourth Street
Las Vegas, NV 89101

j£UL'ii( CjLiUJfi'lU
AnTMiployee of Barney & McKenna, PC.
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IN THE FIFTH DISTRICT COURT FOR?%'WASHINGTON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
CHRISTOPHERSON, F ARRIS, WHITE &
UTLEY, PC, a Utah professional corporation,
Plaintiff,

SUMMARY RULING ON PLAINTIFF'J
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMEN'
Civil No. 030501122
Judge G. Rand Beacham

vs.
DEANNA PUGH,
Defendant

This matter came before the Court on Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment,
which was filed with a supporting memorandum and other materials on May 11, 2004.
Defendant filed her opposing memorandum and materials on May 24, 2004. Plaintiff filed
a reply memorandum on June 1, 2004 and a request to submit for decision on June 4, 2004.
Neither party requested a hearing.
Having reviewed the lengthy memoranda and numerous other materials filed by the
parties, the Court grants Plaintiffs motion for the following reasons:
1.

Despite the length of the memoranda, the Court finds no genuine issue of

material fact. There may be issues as to many immaterial facts, but much of Defendant's
argument is simply imaginative parsing of contract language to avoid its clear intent.
Summary judgment may not be avoided by resorting to quibbling over irrelevancies.
2.

Plaintiff is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, as requested in its motion.
i

Defendant's arguments fail because they are, variously, (a) based on unrealistic expectations,

such as Plaintiffs failure to answer questions that Defendant never asked, (b) based on an
unrealistic view of the attorney/client relationship, both generally and as pertaining to the
facts of this case, (c) based on cynical speculation about acts, motives, and events which did
not occur, (d) based on a lack of understanding of the unusual nature of the legal matter for
which Defendant originally employed Plaintiff, and (e) based on a lack of understanding of,
or a refusal to understand, the nature of legal services and the ethical obligations of attorneys.
3.

Defendant's memorandum appears to be the product of the unauthorized

practice of law. Defendant has repeatedly argued to this Court that she lacks the training and
ability to represent herself, and the Court agrees with Defendant on this point and has advised
her to get an attorney. At least twice, Defendant has attempted to be represented by a person
not licensed to practice law, and the Court has entered at least two orders denying
Defendant's attempts. In light of these facts, Defendant's 31-page memorandum, with 19
attachments and many citations to legal authorities, clearly appears to be the product of the
unauthorized practice of law by some unidentified person who is hoping to "assist"
Defendant. This Court does not sanction the unauthorized practice of law or knowingly
allow any litigant to profit from the unauthorized practice of law.
Accordingly, Plaintiffs motion is granted and judgment shall be entered for (1) the
full amount of unpaid fees for Plaintiffs services rendered, (2) interest at the contract rate
on all unpaid fees, and (3) reasonable attorney's fees and costs for this action; Plaintiffs

2

counsel should submit an appropriate judgment pursuant to Rule 7 of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure,
Dated this ^

day of June, 2004.

C_S\j-^Ih^
G. RAND BEACHAM, JUDGE
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING OR HAND DELIVERY
I hereby certify that on this ^ 3

day ofij^u^. , 2004, I provided true and correct

copies of the foregoing SUMMARY RULING to each of the attorneys/parties named below
by placing a copy in such attorney's file in the Clerk's Office at the Fifth District Courthouse
in St. George, Utah and/or by placing a copy in the United States Mail, first-class postage
prepaid, and addressed as follows:
Heath Snow
Attorney for Plaintiff
P.O. Box 2710
St. George, Utah 84771
Deanna Pugh
Defendant
448 East Telegraph, No. 78
Washington, Utah 84780
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